


Connected Vehicle Policy Program

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
USDOT Connected Vehicle Policy Program Organizational Structure 9/2012





Security Credential Management System (SCMS)

SCMS represents the entire system, and CMEs house the functions





Organizational Implications of the SCMS

Organizational, Institutional, and Policy Considerations

- Different organizational models are being considered for the system
- Current analysis based on new design
- Major cost drivers of SCMS:
 - Hardware and software needs (~50-60% of total costs)
 - Numbers of physical locations of functions and organizations
 - Choice of organizational model oversight, management, and efficiency
- Various ownership options being analyzed
 - Public-private partnership, all private
 - Will impact organizational models and costs
- If or how PII may be collected as part of registration into the system is being analyzed
- Internal controls and policies needed to protect security and privacy are being analyzed



Four scenarios:

- Mostly cellular system
- Mostly cellular with some installation of DSRC RSE
- "All DSRC"
- CAMP Phased Deployment Scenarios

Three principal cost drivers:

- On-Board Equipment (OBE) is a significant in-vehicle cost in all scenarios
- Road-Side Equipment (RSE) is a significant infrastructure cost in an "All DSRC" scenario
- Cellular may be a significant cost in those scenarios that rely on it for certificate delivery



Communications System for Security

- Delivery of the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is expensive and technically demanding
- With incremental or no CRL delivery:
 - Certificate Authority maintains CRL, but does not distribute. Instead, certificates are withheld from misbehaving vehicles.
 - Cellular data costs drop substantially.
- With no CRL distribution, OBE costs are the most expensive part of the system:
 - OBE costs vary slightly for each scenario due to cost and power consumption of subcomponents
 - OBEs are necessary for safety, so the incremental costs to serve the function of communicating to the SCMS are relatively small
 - <u>Results are very sensitive to inputs; uncertainty in conclusions is</u> <u>high</u>



Communications System for Security

- For an "All DSRC" scenario, the number of RSEs nationwide depends on risk tolerance and coverage requirements:
 - Estimates vary from 1300 RSEs to150,000 RSEs
 - Unanswered Questions:
 - What level of coverage is acceptable?
 - How frequently must a vehicle interact with the system?
- Lowest cost scenario hinges on number of RSEs required
 - Cellular scenarios are lowest cost if "All DSRC" requires many RSE
 - OBE costs become most important if "All DSRC" requires fewer RSE



Communications System for Security

- Operational issues and unknown variables dramatically impact costs of cellular options
 - Cellular scenario highly sensitive to changes in the misbehavior rate, CRL variable data size, and peak prices
- Installation, operation and maintenance of RSE's pose significant challenges for DRSC options
 - Placement of RSE's in state or locally owned equipment cabinets and rights-of-way would require a significant implementation permitting, coordination and system integration effort
 - Placement of RSE on private property may be an alternative but would also require a strategy for implementation



Other Implementation /Technical Policy Issues

- Business Models
- Infrastructure Analysis AASHTO
- Spectrum
- Core System Architecture Analysis
- Standards and Certification Needs Identification



- NHTSA has authority to support:
 - Key aspects of V2V communications
 - Regulation of critical equipment, messages and applications if related to safety
 - Provision of the security required to support a V2V rule by a non-Federal entity, as through a procurement or other form of agreement or indirectly via a V2V regulation
- FHWA does not have authority to require installation of roadside infrastructure



Other Legal Policy Issues

- Intellectual Property
- Privacy
 - Need to distinguish between trip-trackability and ability to identify bad actors on the system
 - DOT will do comprehensive review of any final system and involve appropriate privacy community

